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A RE-EXAMINATION OF MALICE
AFORETHOUGHT
ROLLIN M. PERIKNSt
MALIcE aforethought is one of the most common watchwords in the homi-
cide cases. Has it a real contribution to offer, or is it merely a euphoni-
ous phrase used to conceal the absence of an idea?
In the endeavor to probe for the import of this ancient term, no avenue
of approach seems more suitable than an inquiry into what it very clearly
does not mean. It does not, for example, indicate either "malice" or
"aforethought" in what may be called the face value of these words.
"Malice," as it is commonly used in the street, implies hatred, grudge, ill-
will or spite. But no such notion is incorporated in the expression "malice
aforethought."1  A homicide committed for no purpose other than to
satisfy a feeling of hatred or grudge will be murder,2 it is true, but this
crime may be perpetrated without the slightest trace of personal ill-will.
Illustrations of this include the case of a mother who kills her illegitimate
offspring to hide her own disgrace, feeling at the time no hatred toward
it or any other person and even having the yearnings of a mother's love
toward the innocent victim-loving its life just less than her own
reputation.3 There may be added the suicide pact between the pair
whose illicit love was so great as to make death seem preferable to living
apart. As a result of this agreement the man, with great reluctance, shot
the woman and then turned upon himself the weapon which failed at that
time to discharge.4 Even more illuminating is the case of the husband
who killed his wife at her request, because his love was too great to permit
tProfessor of Law, State University of Iowa; legal adviser to the American Law Insti-
tute on Criminal Procedure and on Administration of the Criminal Law.
1. 4 BL. Coant. (1897) 198; State v. Jones, 2 Penn. 573, 47 Atl. 1006 (Del. 1900) ; People
v. Lucas, 244 Ill. 603, 91 N. E. 659 (1910); Commonwealth v. Drum, 58 Pa. 9, 15 (1868);
McCoy v. State, 25 Tex. 33, 39 (1860).
2. Ellis v. State, 120 Ala. 333, 338-9, 25 So. 1, 2-3 (1898). "'Malice,' in its legal sense,
differs from the meaning which it bears in common speech. In common acceptation it signi-
fies ill-will, hatred, or revenge toward a particular individual. Such a condition of mind
would, of course, constitute malice in the eye of the law, but such is not necessarily its legal
sense." Pembrook v. State, 117 Neb. 759, 763, 222 N. W. 956, 957 (1929).
3. Jones v. State, 29 Ga. 594, 607 (1860).
4. Turner v. State, 119 Tenn. 663, 108 S. W. 1139 (1907). This story by the defendant
was not without some evidence to support it, although it was by no means free from doubt.
But the court held this to be first degree murder even on his own statement.
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the continuance of her suffering from a hopeless disease.' All of such
homicides fulfill every requirement of malice aforethought.
It is perhaps inaccurate to speak of "aforethought" as having any com-
mon usage on the street. At its face value, however, it means "thought of
beforehand," and the layman uses this phrase to imply the mental process
involved where a matter has been pondered over for a substantial period
of time in advance. But not even "wilful, deliberate and premeditated
malice aforethought" conveys any such message as this to the legal mind.
First degree murder can be established on this basis, although the intent
to kill is "formed by the accused immediately before the act is actually
committed," 6 or "at the very moment the fatal shot was fired." 7 As one
court has said: "The act may follow the intent as rapidly as thought may
pass through the mind, and if the intent [to kill] be followed by an act
which results in the taking of human life with malice aforethought, it is
murder in the first degree." 8 It has also been said that a killing may be
with malice aforethought although it is done "on the impulse of the
moment," 9 or "on the spur of the moment."10  This has led some courts
and writers to attribute no meaning whatever to the word "aforethought,"
as used in this phrase, "inasmuch as the state of mind which causes the
act must of necessity precede it,"" leaving them with the conclusion that
"malice" and "malice aforethought" are synonymous terms.'2 In view,
however, of the dissimilarity of meaning between "malice aforethought"
and "malice" as the latter is used either on the street or in the law in
other than homicide cases,'" there appears to be adequate reason for
keeping the phrase intact.' 4
"Malice," to elaborate a part of the previous statement, is frequently
used in the law to mean "the intentional doing of an unlawful act." 5
But many such acts are not done with malice aforethought. 6 Even the
5. People v. Roberts, 211 Mich. 187, 178 N. W. 690 (1920).
6. Wooten v. State, 104 Fla. 597, 599, 140 So. 474 (1932).
7. State v. Hall, 54 Nev. 213, 13 P. (2d) 624, 632 (1932).
8. People v. Weeks, 104 Cal. App. 708, 712, 286 Pac. 514, 515 (1930). See also People v.
Russo, 24 P. (2d) 580 (Cal. App. 1933); Maestas v. People, 91 Colo. 36, 11 P. (2d) 227
(1932).
9. Talley v. State, 174 Ala. 101, 106, 57 So. 445, 447 (1912).
10. State v. Heidelberg, 120 La. 300, 306, 45 So. 256, 258 (1908).
11. 3 STEPHEx, HISTORY OF CI.aIr=AL LAW OF ENGLAND (1883) 70.
12. Turner v. Commonwealth, 167 Ky. 365, 381, 180 S. W. 768, 769 (1915).
13. Cribbs v. State, 86 Ala. 613, 615, 6 So. 109, 110 (1888).
14. Stephens v. State, 47 Ala. 696 (1872) ; Brett v. State, 94 Miss. 669, 47 So. 781 (1909);
Cravey v. State, 36 Tex. Cr. App. 90, 35 S. W. 658 (1896).




wrongful intention to take human life may fail to meet the legal require-
ments of this phrase, as where such design is formed in the sudden heat
of passion engendered by great provocation.' In fact, even a casual
analysis reveals that an intentional homicide may be murder,18 or it may
be manslaughter, 9 or it may be no crime at all;"0 that an unintentional
homicide may be murder,2' or it may be manslaughter,22 or it may be
no crime at all.2 3  Moreover, malice aforethought is frequently said
to be implied. An adequate understanding of the import of "implied
malice," however, must be prefaced by an examination into the history
of felonious homicide.
I
Historical Division of Felonious Homicide into Murder and Manslaughter
According to the ancient common law of England, only those homicides
were innocent which were caused in the enforcement of justice,2" such as
the execution of a lawful sentence of death or the "slaying of an outlaw
17. Dye v. State, 127 Miss. 492, 90 So. 180 (1921); State v. Wilson, 95 W. Va. 525, 531,
121 S. E. 726, 728 (1924). By statute, what was voluntary manslaughter at common law
is sometimes declared to be murder, but this is murder without malice aforethought.
Davis v. State, 110 Tex. Cr. App. 605, 607-8, 10 S. W. (2d) 116, 117 (1928); State v.
Cooley, 165 Wash. 638, 5 P. (2d) 1005 (1931).
18. This is the typical case of murder with express malice aforethought, if the killing is
without justification, excuse or adequate provocation. State v. Fleming, 17 Idaho 471, 493,
106 Pac. 305, 318 (1910).
19. See note 17, supra. "There is a difference between the intent to kill and an intent to
murder; and the former may exist when one intends only such killing as amounts to man-
slaughter." Commonwealth v. Demboski, 186 N. E. 589, 591 (Mass. 1933).
20. "Justifiable or excusable homicide may be committed with a calm, sedate and de-
liberate mind, and a formed design to kill another." Crook v. State, 27 Tex. App. 198, 242,
11 S. W. 444, 447 (1889).
21. As, for example, where a robber unintentionally kills a'person he was robbing at the
point of a gun. McCutcheon v. State, 199 Ind. 247, 155 N. E. 544 (1927); Commonwealth
v. McManus, 282 Pa. 25, 127 AtI. 316 (1925); State v. Best, 44 Wyo. 383, 12 P. (2d) 1110
(1932).
22. As, for example, the typical case of homicide by criminal negligence. Wright v. State,
166 Ga. 1, 141 S. E. 903 (1928) ; People v. Buzan, 351 Ill. 610, 184 N. E. 890 (1933) ; State
v. Stansell, 203 N. C. 69, 164 S. E. 580 (1932); State v. Quick, 168 S. C. 76, 167 S. E. 19
(1932).
23. As, for example, the non-negligent killing while performing a lawful act-the typical
homicide by misadventure. Commonwealth v. Matthews, 89 Ky. 287, 12 S. W. 333 (1889) ;
State v. Turnage, 138 N. C. 566, 49 S. E. 913 (1905). "The statute protects the appellant if
he committed the homicide by accident or misfortune (a) in 'doing any other lawful act
by lawful means, with usual and ordinary caution, and without unlawful intent. .. .
State v. Welch, 25 P. (2d) 211, 214 (N. M. 1933).
24. 2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, HISTORY oF ENGLIsH LAW (1895) 476.
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or a hand-having thief or other manifest felon who resists capture.""o
These killings were justifiable 6 and the slayer was entitled to an acquittal
if brought to trial. He who had caused the death of another by misad-
venture or in the necessary defense of his own life 7 or while he was of
unsound mind28 had no legal defense. In 1203, for example, Robert of
Herthdale, arrested for having in self-defense slain a madman who had
previously killed five men in his insane fury, was not acquitted on this
ground, but was retained in custody, "for the king must be consulted
about this matter."29 And in 1214 Roger of Stainton, who had killed a
girl by accident, was spared only by a royal pardon.30 Such cases, let it
be emphasized, called originally for a special act of grace, for "the king
himself must decide in each case whether life and limb shall be spared.'
And the royal pardon, while it saved the slayer's life, did not shield him
from the forfeiture of his goods.2 "In early days 'there could be little
law about this, for all depended upon the king's grace,' ",3 but later the
rule changed and such a pardon was granted by the chancellor as a
matter of course without referring the matter to the king. 4 Homicides
which entitled the slayer to a pardon, even though they resulted in con-
viction and forfeiture of goods, were spoken of as having been committed
"without felony" 3 -- they were pardonable or "excusable.1 36  Later the
procedure changed, partly with the aid of legislation, and evidence of
excusable self-defense, for example, disproved the charge itself and
entitled the accused to an acquittal.38
25. Ibid.
26. 2 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (1926) 358.
27. "The man who commits homicide by misadventure or in self-defence deserves but
needs a pardon." 2 PoLLocx AND MArrLAND, op. cit. supra note 24, at 477. "We do not
think that in the thirteenth century a homicide in self-defence would have been justifiable,
even though it was perpetrated in the endeavor to prevent a felony." Ibid. n. 3.
28. Id. at 478.
29. 1 SEIDEN" SOCIETY, SELECt PLEAS OF THE CROWN (1887) No. 70.
30. Ibid.
31. 2 POLLOCB AND MAITLAND, op. cit. supra note 24, at 481.
32. 3 HOLDSwoRTH, op. cit. supra note 26, at 312.
33. Id. at 313, quoting 2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, op. cit. supra note 24, at 483.
34. Note, Firz HERBERT, CORONE (1329) 361.
35. 2 POLLoCK AND MAITAND, op. cit. supra note 24, at 483; 3 HOLDswORTH, op. cit.
supra note 26, at 312. Roger of Stainton, for example, was said to have killed by mis-
adventure and "not by felony" although the royal pardon was needed to spare his life. 1
SELDEN Soc=-ry, op. cit. supra note 29, No. 114.
36. 3 HOLDSWORTr, op. Cit. sura note 26, at 311.
37. 24 HEN. VIII, c. 5 (1532).
38. ANON. Y. B. TarN. 26 HEN. VIII, f. 5, pl. 21 (1534).
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Thus the early common law, with good and sufficient reason, 9 grouped
the homicide cases as follows: (1) justifiable, (2) excusable, and (3)
felonious. Moreover, it knew but one degree of felonious homicide,40
if the additional torture provided for traitors be ignored.4 ' In other
words all homicide which was not justifiable or excusable was felonious.
The word "murdrum" or "murder" (at one time reserved for secret
slayings)1 2 came to be applied to the more serious forms of felonious
homicide (which perhaps had long been the popular meaning) ,4 but this
was largely a matter of mere terminology. Every felonious killing was
punishable by death,44 whether it amounted to murder or not, while on the
other hand it was within the benefit of clergy even if it was murder of the
most atrocious nature.4" Hence it was of very little practical importance
whether a criminal homicide merited the label "murder" or not.46  He
who was convicted of felonious homicide might suffer death, or he might
escape with branding and a short term of imprisonment. Whether the
penalty in a particular case was one or the other depended, not upon the
circumstances of the killing, but solely upon the qualifications of the
39. If the distinction between justifiable and excusable homicide is to be retained in
modern law, the difference should certainly be grounded upon other than purely historical
reasons. One who kills another in self-defense, under circumstances in which he was privi-
leged by law to make use of deadly force to save his own life, should be said to have com-
mitted justifiable homicide (in spite of the fact that it was originally excusable only) because
what is authorized by law is in every proper sense, justified. But one who kills another by
accident may, under certain circumstances, be excused, but cannot properly be said to be
justified.
40. 2 POLLOCK AND MAImAND, op. cit. supra note 24, at 484.
41. Ibid. "In the first place I may observe that murders of a particular class were separ-
ated from other cases of homicide by being classified as petty treason.' 3 Sm rnn, op. cit.
supra note 11, at 34.
42. "And first of murder, which anciently signified only the private killing of a man,
for which by force of a law introduced by King Canutus for the preservation of his Danes,
the town or hundred where the fact was done, was to be amerced to the king, unless they
could prove that the person slain were an Englishman, (which proof was called Engleschire),
or could produce the offender, etc." 1 HAwK. P. C. (1824) c. 31, § 1. See also BRACTON, DE
Lr~inus, 134 b.
43. 2 POLLOCK AND MaTLAND, op. cit. supra note 24, at 486.
44. "The outlaw forfeits all, life and limb, lands and goods. .. . The Conqueror would
have no one banged; emasculation and exoculation were to serve instead. . . . Very slowly
in the course of the thirteenth century the penalty of death took the place of mutilation
as the punishment due for felons-and this without legislation." 2 PoLtoc A-,m MAiTLAND,
op. cit. supra note 24, at 459-60.
45. "Up to this time ... all homicide, unless it was justifiable, se dejendo or by mis-
adventure, was felonious and so punishable by death, and was also within benefit of clergy
whether it did or did not amount to murder." 3 STEPHEr, op. cit. supra note 11, at 44.
46. The only distinction seems to have been that murder was not within the terms of
any general pardon. Ibid.
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slayer. It was the general expansion of benefit of clergy, together with
statutes, that withdrew certain specific offenses from its protecting in-
fluence, which drew the line between murder and manslaughter.
The harsh severity of the early English law was alleviated to some
extent by various devices resorted to by the judges for this purpose.
Among these may be mentioned an ultra-technical interpretation of the
rules of criminal procedure and of substantive criminal law (the effects
of which still handicap the administration of justice)," together with
an equally absurd liberality in recognizing the privilege known as "benefit
of clergy." It is the latter with which we are here concerned. In ancient
times the lay courts did not have criminal jurisdiction over the clergy
in felony cases.4" The members of the clergy could be tried only in
the ecclesiastical court and could be punished only by such penalty as
that court could inflict.49 It was an "elementary rule that the church
would never pronounce a judgment of blood,"5 and ultimately, after a
change in the procedure,"' the chief characteristic of benefit of clergy
was that it shielded those who qualified for its protection from the capital
part of the punishment which was otherwise a necessary consequence
of felony convictions.
The manner in which benefit of clergy was used to mitigate the blood-
thirsty demands of the early law was through an extension of it altogether
beyond its proper boundaries. Whereas originally "the only persons who
could claim the privilege were ordained clerks, monks and nuns,"' ;3 the
courts later extended it to include every man who could read. 4 Under
relatively early statutory provisions which prevailed until 1779, the
convicted felon who escaped the death penalty by benefit of clergy was
(unless he was a peer or a clerk in orders) branded in the hand and sub-
jected to imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year. 5  The net
47. As Justice Holmes said (in a larceny case): "This distinction is not very stisfactory,
but it is due to historical accidents in the development of the criminal law, coupled, perhaps,
with an unwillingness on the part of the judges to enlarge the limit of a capital offence."
Commonwealth v. Ryan, 155 Mass. 523, 30 N. E. 364 (1892).
48. 3 HoLDswoRTH, op. cit. supra note 26, at 294; 1 STEPHEN, op. cit. supra note 11, at
459.
49. 1 PoLLocx AND MATLAND, op. cit. supra note 24, at 424.
50. Id. at 427.
51. Id. at 437-440.
52. 3 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. supra note 26, at 298-9.
53. Id. at 296. There "seems no reason for doubting that nuns were entitled to the
same privilege, though, to their credit be it said, we have in our period found no cases
which prove this." 1 POLLOCx AND MAITAND, op. cit. supra note 24, at 428.
54. 1 SP=N, op. cit. supra note 11, at 461. It required a statute to extend the privi-
lege to women. 4 WELL. & MATRY, c. 9 (1692).
55. 1 STEPHENT, op. cit. supra note 11, at 462-3. The provision for branding was added
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result of this device for alleviating the severity of the penal law was
that of two persons convicted of the same felony one might be hanged
while the other was branded and imprisoned for a short term, due solely
to the fact that the latter could read whereas the former could not. That
this was ultimately changed by statute is more readily understandable
than the long delay in accomplishing this end.5
The first step in correcting this absurd distinction between defendants
who could read and those who were illiterate was an exclusion of certain
felonies from the protecting influence of benefit of clergy. 57  The next
was the removal of the necessity for reading as a qualification for this
benefit.18 The result of these two moves was that all felonies were divided
into two classes, those that were "clergyable" and those that were not.
Persons convicted of "clergyable" felonies were not punished capitally,
even if they were illiterate, whereas ability to read no longer saved the
life of one who had been convicted of a felony which the statute declared
to be "without benefit of clergy." 9
Such a development could not but have an important bearing upon
the law of homicide. A series of statutes, during the period from 1496
to 1547,09 excluded from benefit of clergy certain of the more serious
forms of felonious homicide, referring to them as murder committed with
malice aforethought (malice prepensed). The result of these statutes
by statute in 1487 (4 HEN. VII, c. 13) and that for imprisonment not to exceed one year in
1576 (18 ELiz. c. 7, §§ 2, 3).
56. "Till 1487 any one who knew how to read might commit murder 'as often as he
pleased, with no other result than that of being delivered to the ordinary to make his purga-
tion, with the chance of being delivered to him 'absque purgatione That this should have
been the law for several centuries seems hardly credible, but there is no doubt that it was.
Even after 1487 a man who could read could commit murder once with no other punish-
ment than that of having M branded on the brawn of his left thumb . . ." 1 STEP=, op.
zit. supra note 11, at 463-4.
57. To speak of this as a "step" is figurative only, since it resulted in a long series of
statutes. The matter was considerably overdone. Thus Blackstone lamented the existence
in his day of one hundred and sixty "felonies without benefit of clergy." 4 BL. CoMM.
(1897) 18.
58. 5 AtN= c. 6 (1705). The privilege had been extended to women by statute in 1692.
See note 54, supra.
59. The statutory provision is frequently spoken of in this form. See, for example, 4
BL. CoMM. (1897) 18. The statutes themselves spoke in some such terms as that one
convicted, etc. "shall not be admitted to have or enjoy the privilege or benefit of clergy or
sanctuary, but shall be put from the same. . . ." 1 EDW. VI, c. 12, § 10 (1547).
60. 12 HN. VII, c. 7 (1496); 4 HEx. VIII, c. 2 (1512); 23 HE. VIII, c. 1, §§ 3, 4
(1531); 1 EDw. VI, c. 12, § 10 (1547).
61. The expressions used are such as "wilful prepensed murders," "prepensedly murder"
(12 H~m. VII, c. 7 (1496); "murder upon malice prepensed" (4 HFEN. VIII, c. 2 (1512);
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was to divide felonious homicide into two main categories depending upon
whether or not the killing was committed with malice aforethought. If
it was with malice aforethought the punishment was death and the offense
was called "murder"; if it was without malice aforethought it was
punished by a brand upon the brawn of the thumb and imprisonment
not to exceed a year.2 The word "manslaughter" was adopted to
describe this lesser grade of felonious homicide.63
II
Early Meanings of Malice Aforethought
The phrase "malice aforethought," however, had made its appearance
in the law long before this legislation had put certain types of felonious
homicide beyond the protection of benefit of clergy. But strangely
enough, its original meaning was altogether different from that with
which it was used in these statutes. For example, in 1329, the jurors,
in bringing in a verdict of conviction64 of excusable homicide, included
in their finding-in order to entitle the defendant to a pardon-that he
had killed the deceased "in self-defence, and not by felony or of malice
aforethought." 5 Moreover, the patent rolls of Henry III point to this
as a common formula in pardons granted in the 1200's to those who
had committed homicide by misadventure, in self-defense or while of
unsound mind. For example: "Whereas our justices in their eyre in
such a county have informed us . . . that Nicholas of Frackenham slew
Roger of Mepham by misadventure and not by felony or malice afore-
"wilful murder of malice prepensed" (23 HEX. VIII, c. 1 (1531); "Murder of malice pre-
pensed" (1 EDW. VI, c. 12 (1547).
"62. Until 1705 when the requirement of reading was removed as a qualification for benefit
of clergy (see note 58, supra), an illiterate convicted of manslaughter was capitally
punished.
63. Staunford distinguishes between homicide "par chance medley" and "par voy de
murder." STAUNTORD, PLEE DEL CORON (1560) 19 A.
"... felonious homicide, which is not murder, came to be known as homicide by chance-
medley, and, later still, as manslaughter." 3 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. supra note 26, at 314.
"This distinction between murder and manslaughter only, is occasioned by the statute of
23 H. 8 and other statutes that took away the benefit of clergy from murder committed by
malice prepensed, which statutes have been the occasion of many nice speculations." Regina
v. Mawgridge, Kel. 119, 121 (1707).
In 1553 it was held that one indicted for murder could be convicted of manslaughter.
Matters of the Crown Happening at Salop, 1 Plow. 97, 101 (1553).
64. The defendant was not acquitted but was "remitted to prison to wait for the mercy
of the king," according to the practice of that time.
65. Anonymous, Frrz HERBERT, op. cit. supra note 34, at 284. Translated in 3 STPHR,
op. cit. supra note 11, at 39.
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thought-or that William King killed Ralph de le Grave in self-defence
and not of malice aforethought-or . . . that Maud who is in prison
for slaying her two sons killed them in a fit of madness and not by felony
or malice aforethought . . . now we have pardoned," and so forth. 6
Thus the former function of this phrase seems to have been to dis-
tinguish homicides which were felonious from those which were excusable.
As so used it seems to mean little more than intentional wrongdoing,"
with in fact no strong emphasis on the intention other than to exclude
harm by misadventure.' Bearing in mind the fact that before the period
of these statutes the word "murder" had come to refer to some of the
more serious forms of felonious homicide, while the phrase "malice afore-
thought" seems to have covered all forms, one might be led to the con-
clusion that it was "murder" rather than "malice aforethought" which
was employed for the purpose of distinguishing the felonious homicides
that were to be put beyond the reach of benefit of clergy, from those
that were left upon their former footing. The language of the statutes,
however, fails to support such an inference.6 9 Apparently it was homi-
cide by waylaying which was the particular object of this legislative
attention, 70 and the word aforethought (prepensed) was there used in
the sense of a design meditated upon for a substantial period of time
in advance. Perhaps the most illuminating decision on this point is to
be found just a few years after the last of these statutes was enacted.
The statute of Edward VI,71 which was the broadest of the group, was
passed in 1547. In 1553 it was held that if four persons joined in killing
66. 2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, op. cit. supra note 24, at 478.
67. "When we first meet with malice prepense it seems to mean little more than inten-
tional wrong-doing. . . ." Id. at 467.
68. Ibid. note.
69. The first of the group (12 ie. VII, c. 7 (1496)) does not use this phrase but speaks
of "prepensedly murder." See also the second (4 HEN. VIII, c. 2 (1512)) which presents
three categories, in only one of which "malice prepensed" appears.
70. "If we are right, the guet-apens which in modern French law raises a mere meutre
to the dignity of an assassinat, is first cousin to the malice aforethought which characterizes
our English murder; both go back to days when waylaying is a specially heinous crime and
a cause for royal interference." 2 POLLOcK AND MAITLAND, op. cit. supra note 24, at 467,
n. 2. "In 1270 the Earl of Warenne and Alan de la Zouche were litigating before the
justices in Westminster Hall. From words they came to blows and Warenne's retainers griev-
ously wounded Alan so that after a while he died. Warenne was allowed to make his
peace on paying 5000 marks to the king and 2000 to the wounded man and on swearing
with fifty compurgators that the deed was done 'non ex praecogitata malitia ... sed ex
motu iracundiae nimis accensae.' Here we already have the contrast between 'malice afore-
thought' and a 'sudden falling out'; but apparently we have rather an act of grace than a
judicial sentence." 2 POLLOCK AND MArLAND, op. cit. supra note 24 at 484, n. 2.
71. 1 EDW. VI, c. 12, § 10 (1547).
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a man, three of them having planned the homicide in advance, while the
fourth joined them on the spur of the moment because he happened to
be present, the three were guilty of murder, while as for the other this
was "manslaughter in him, and not murder, because he had not malice
prepense.72  Moreover, Lambard, writing in 1581,71 uses malice afore-
thought in the sense of real and substantial premeditation. He does not
require direct and positive evidence of the well-laid plan in every case.
In fact, even in his writings are to be found seeds of the influences which
were eventually to whittle away every trace of the time element of malice
aforethought. But the starting point seems to be a rather reasonable
inference of fact-that a killing without any apparent motive must have
been due to a concealed motive. Hence he says that in case of an in-
tentional killing without apparent provocation, the law judges the fatal
act "to have proceeded of former malice meditated within his owne
minde, howsoever it bee kept secret from the sight of other men. 7 4
III
"Express" and "Implied" Malice
It is at this point that we find the origin of "express malice" and "im-
plied malice," terms whose meanings have shifted during the change of
import of the basic phrase itself. The classic definition of the former is
this: "Express malice is when one, with a sedate deliberate mind and
formed design, doth kill another: which formed design is evidenced by
external circumstances discovering that inward intention; as laying in
72. Matters of the Crown Happening at Salop, supra note 63, at 100. The following
statement in this case is important: ".... if he kills them to whom he had before-hand in-
tended to offer such violence . . ." The absence of any trace of provocation is note-
worthy. In fact, when the element of provocation is first introduced, its importance is
merely because it points to the killing as a sudden occurrence rather than the result of a
well-laid plan.
".. . the law shall adjudge it to be upon that sudden occasion and stirring of blood,
being also provoked at the sight of his son's blood, that he made that assault, and will
not presume it to be upon any former malice, unless it be found." Royley's Case, Cro.
Jac. 296 (1612) (italics added). See also Rex v. Mawgridge, 12 Co. Rep. 87 (1611). The
modern rule of provocation as a concession to the weakness of human nature was a later
development. "There is no difference between murder, and manslaughter; but that the one
is upon malice aforethought, and the other upon a sudden occasion . . ." 3 Co. INST.
(1797) 55.
73. William Lambard, 1536-1601. His Eirenarcha was published in 1581. See 4 HorDs-
woRaT, op. cit. supra note 26, at 118.
74. LAmBARD, EumEARcmA (1619) 239. He also expresses the same idea in this form:
"So, many times the law doth (by the sequelle) judge of that malice which lurked before
within the partie, and doth accordingly make imputation of it." Ibid.
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wait, antecedent menaces, former grudges, and concerted schemes to do
him some bodily harm."7  And Coke speaks of "malice fore-thought,
either expressed by the party or implied by law."76 "The words 'express
or implied,'" said one court, "add nothing to the meaning of the word
'malice'. They do not imply different kinds of malice, but merely the
manner in which the only kind known to the law may be shown to exist,
-that is, either by positive evidence or by inference.177
The notion that one who killed a man whom he had intended only to
rob, was guilty of murder had made its appearance in the days of
Lambard, and was explained by him on the ground that the law "implyeth
a former malicious disposition in him rather to kill the man, than not to
have his money from him.""8  This does not carry conviction as an in-
ference of fact. It falls distinctly into the field of fiction, by which there
is imputed to a man a state of mind which was not actually present."9
On this cornerstone is laid the foundation for quite a different meaning
for the words "express" and "implied," as qualifying the phrase "malice
aforethought," and there begins to appear, thinly camouflaged by fiction
for a time, the recognition of an actual difference in the states of mind
represented by these two terms. The distinction could not escape the
attention of Hale who referred to them as malice in fact, and malice
in law. 0
For a time the fictitious formula prevailed. An intent to kill or injure
was required for malice aforethought; but in certain cases, such as the
robber who killed his victim by accident during the attempt to rob him,
the slayer was conclusively presumed to have had such an intent.8 ' This
75. 4 B.. CoMMar. (1897) 199.
76. 3 Co. INsT. (1797) 47 (italics added).
77. State v. Milam, 88 S. C. 127, 130, 70 S. E. 447, 449 (1910). This is one of the
best statements of the ancient view, but does not picture the general notion at the time of
this case.
78. LABAmD, op. cit. supra note 74, at 241.
79. "First, imaice prepense is half accidentally made the test of murder. It is then de-
fined to mean a deliberate premeditated design to kill or hurt. This being found too nar-
row a definition, it is enlarged by the remark that killing without apparent provocation
raises a presumption in fact of concealed motive. This being still too narrow, the pre-
sumption, in fact, becomes a presumption of law applying to all cases of unprovoked killing,
even if, in fact, premeditation is disproved." 3 STEP-EN, op. cit. supra note 11, at 63.
80. "Such a malice therefore, that makes the killing of a man to be murder, is of two
kinds, 1 Malice in fact, or 2 Malice in law, or ex praesumptione legis. Malice in fact is a
deliberate intention of doing some corporal harm to the person of another." 1 HALE P. C.
(1847) 451.
81. "This implication of a species of malice which did not exist seems to have been in-
vented for the purpose of bringing cases of constructive murder, so called, within what
was supposed to be the legal definition of the crime. It was evidently supposed . . .
that the phrase, nwlice aforethought, used in indictnents for murder, necessarily imputed a
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could not conceal the fact that the malice "implied" in such a case had
reference to a different psychical element than the actual intent to cause
death or bodily harm, and in the course of generations judges tended
more and more to override the fiction and to recognize frankly that there
may be malice aforethought without any design to kill or injure. 2
The terms "express malice aforethought" and "implied malice afore-
thought," as now used, are the accidental result of a long series of de-
cided cases. They have tended much to confuse the law of felonious
homicide. If one single contribution of value has been made by them
it remains as yet undiscovered. But they cannot be ignored because of
their frequent appearance in legal literature. The common law felt no
particular urge to define them with precision because the crime and the
punishment were the same whichever label was applied. Hence the lack
of uniformity of definition need occasion no surprise.
"Express malice aforethought," for example, will be found to have
four different meanings in different jurisdictions, even if occasional re-
versions to the ancient usage be ignored.8 3 These differences result from
disagreement as to whether the phrase is limited to an intent to kill or
includes also an intent to inflict great bodily injury, and whether it is
limited to an intent which was directed against the very person who was
killed or includes an intent to inflict such harm upon another. Thus
express malice aforethought has been said to mean (assuming the absence
of justification or excuse or any mitigating circumstance sufficient to
reduce the homicide to manslaughter): (1) an intent to kill the very
person killed;8" (2) an intent to kill the very person killed or to inflict
charge of premeditated design to kill. To meet this averment, which in cases of constructive
murder was not required to be proved, the law was said to imply, that is, to supply by
mere fiction,. the requisite degree of malice. There was, however, in truth not the slight-
est necessity for this fiction; the interpretation of the word malice, on which it was founded,
being entirely erroneous." Darry v. People, 10 N. Y. 120, 138 (1854).
82. Wright v. State, 166 Ga. 1, 141 S. E. 903 (1927); People v. Hartwell, 341 I1. 155,
157, 173 N. E. 112, 113 (1930); McCutcheon v. State, supra note 21, at 257, 155 N.E. at
548; State v. Johnson, 211 Iowa 874, 879, 234 N. W. 263, 266 (1931) ; State v. Sanderson,
169 La. 55, 61, 124 So. 143, 146 (1929); Commonwealth v. Madeiros, 255 Mass. 304, 315,
151 N. E. 297, 300 (1926); State v. Glover, 330 Mo. 709, 50 S. W. (2d) 1049 (1932);
People v. Jernatowski, 238 N. Y. 188, 144 N. E. 497 (1924) ; State v. Best, supra note 21.
83. For a case in which it is said to refer not to the state of mind but only to the man-
ner of proof, see State v. Milam, supra note 77.
For the view that express malice aforethought refers to a preconceived plan, see Anthony
v. State, 21 Miss. 263, 264 (1850). Compare State v. Prettyman, 6 Boyce 452, 455-6, 100
AtI. 476, 478 (Del. 1917).
84. If defendant with a sedate mind and formed design was attempting to kill Scrog-
gins, and in that attempt killed Martha Gray without intending to do so, this homicide
cannot be murder in the first degree because it was "not with express malice to the party
killed." Ferrell v. State, 43 Tex. 503 (1875). See also State v. Fleming, supra note 18.
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great bodily injury upon him; s1 (3) an intent to kill some person; 8 (4)
an intent to cause death or great bodily injury to some person. 7  It is
with the phrase "implied malice aforethought," however, that the chief
difficulties are encountered. During its metamorphosis from a mere
inference of fact to a presumption of law and finally to its frank recogni-
tion as a psychical fact distinct from "express" malice, no one of these
meanings was, unfortunately, entirely lost, and at the present time the
term is tainted with all three.
Malice aforethought is a "subjective condition of the mind, discover-
able only by words and conduct." ' And since it often happens that one
who is acting wrongfully does not put his actual purpose into words, it
is frequently necessary for this "to be inferred from acts committed. 8 9
If, for example, one person should load a revolver, deliberately aim it at
another at close range, and shoot him through the heart, his intent to kill
or inflict great bodily injury would be rather convincingly indicated.
This is not a peculiarity of procedure, but an inference of fact which
would be drawn outside of the court room as readily as in the trial of a
case. In either place, moreover, it might be overcome by further facts.
If it could be shown, for instance, that the deceased was wearing at the
time a vest supposed to be bullet-proof, and that the shooting was merely
for the purpose of demonstrating the protective qualities of the garment,
the inference of an intent to kill would disappear9 0 In the absence of
this, or some other satisfactory explanation of such conduct, the in-
ference would remain, and the term "implied malice" is frequently used
in speaking of such a situation. 1 The confusing effect of this use of the
phrase may be emphasized by pointing out that the malice aforethought
which is "implied" in this sense (inferred as a matter of fact from the
S5. ". . a sedate, deliberate mind and formed design to take the life of, or to do
some great or serious bodily injury to the person killed." State v. Faino, 1 Mary. 492,
501, 41 Atl. 134, 135 (Del. 1894). See also Farrer v. State, 42 Tex. 265 (1875).
86. "Express malice is that deliberate intention unlawfully to take away the life of a
fellow creature." People v. Cochran, 313 Ill. 508, 518, 145 N. E. 207, 211 (1924).
87. "Malice express, is a design formed of taking away another man's life, or of doing
some mischief to another, in the execution of which design death ensues.' Rex v. Oneby,
2 Ld. Raym. 1485, 1489 (1727). See also State v. Brown, 4 Penn. 120, 124, 53 Atl. 354,
355 (Del. 1902).
88. State v. Hamrick, 112 W. Va. 157, 166, 163 S. E. 868, 873 (1932).
89. Stevens v. State, 42 Tex. Cr. App. 154, 173, 59 S. W. 545, 549 (1900).
90. Whether this would or would not be criminal negligence does not concern us here.
91. See, for example, Kennedy v. State, 85 Ala. 326, 332, 5 So. 300, 302 (1888) ; Jacobs
v. State, 28 Tex. App. 79, 82, 12 S. W. 408, 409 (1889); Martinez v. State, 30 Tex. App.




acts of the slayer) is "express" in another sense (the psychical fact thus
found being an intent to kill the person slain).
To avoid this confusion the word "implied" should be rejected when
an inference of fact is intended. The word "inferred" seems most appro-
priate for this purpose and has frequently been so employed by the
courts. 2 Other forms of expression may be adopted without objection,
such as the following: "The deliberate selection and use of a deadly
weapon is a circumstance which indicates a formed design to kill, in the
absence of evidence showing a contrary intent."93 The use of the word
"presumed," however, which has found considerable favor with the courts
in this connection, should not be employed to indicate an inference of
fact. A true presumption is a rule of evidence which calls for a certain
result as far as the particular case is concerned, unless the party ad-
versely affected by the presumption comes forward with evidence to
overcome it. To use the term "presumption" in the sense of "inference"
or probative significance, is a misuse of the word.94
Mention of this misuse is warranted because one of the common ex-
ploitations of the phrase "implied malice" involves a presumption in the
true sense of the word-sometimes spoken of as a "presumption of law"
to distinguish it from the misnamed "presumption of fact."9  It would
be an unreasonable burden upon the prosecution to require it in every
murder case to prove not only the killing of the deceased by the de-
fendant, but also the non-existence of every conceivable set of circum-
stances which might be sufficient to constitute either innocent homicide
or guilt of manslaughter only. Thus the state is not required, in order
to make out a prima facie case of murder, to prove (in addition to the
killing of the deceased by the defendant) that the defendant was not so
insane as to be wanting in criminal capacity,96 or that the killing was not
an accident, or that it did not result from the privileged use of deadly
force,97 or that it did not result from the sudden heat of passion en-
gendered by great provocation, or other matters of this kind. To require
92. McAndrews v. People, 71 Colo. 542, 208 Pac. 486 (1922); State v. Decklotts, 19
Iowa 447, 449 (1865); Stevens v. State, supra note 89, at 157, 59 S. W. at 547; Evans v.
Commonwealth, 170 S. E. 756, 762 (Va. 1933); State v. Wilson, 95 W. Va. 525, 121 S. E.
726 (1924).
93. State v. Galvano, 34 Del. 409, 419, 154 Atl. 461, 465 (1930) (italics added).
94. 5 WiGmORE, EvmENcE (2d ed. 1923) § 2491.
95. "There is in truth but one kind of presumption; and the term 'presumption of fact'
should be discarded as useless and confusing." Ibid.
96. State v. Silverio, 79 N. J. L. 482, 488, 76 Atl. 1069, 1071 (1910).
97. Triplett v. Commonwealth, 245 Ky. 167, 53 S. W. (2d) 345 (1932); McGee v.
State, 144 So. 112 (Ala. 1932).
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such proof, moreover, would constitute an absurd waste of time." This
difficulty is avoided by a rule of law in the form of a presumption. It has
sometimes been said that every homicide is presumed to be with malice
aforethought and that it devolves upon the prisoner to prove circum-
stances which will justify, excuse or mitigate the act. 9 This, however,
is quite generally recognized to be an overstatement of the position. If
the evidence introduced by the state, while showing the killing of the
deceased by the defendant, should at the same time establish some basis
of justification or excuse, the defendant would be entitled to a directed
verdict of acquittal without the introduction of evidence on his part.' 0
Hence it is necessary to put the matter in this form: Every homicide is
presumed to have been committed with malice aforethought "unless the
evidence which proves the killing itself shows it to have been done
without malice."''1  Since this is a presumption in the true sense it
merely places upon the defendant the burden of going forward with
the evidence. 02 It is rebuttable and may be overcome by evidence which
throws a different light upon the situation'03 or which establishes ex-
culpating or mitigating circumstances. 04 If no such evidence is offered,
a conviction of murder is proper because of the "presumed malice."
98. "Trials would be made even more unnecessarily long than they are if all possible
defenses of this sort had to be met in advance without waiting to see whether they are
set up." Per Holmes, C. J., in Commonwealth v. Chance, 174 Mass. 245, 250, 54 N. E.
551, 554 (1899).
99. See, for example, the instruction of the trial judge in McDaniel v. State, 16 Miss.
401, 417 (1847). This was held by the higher court to be "too broad and unrestricted."
Sometimes such presumption is said to be limited to homicides committed with a deadly
weapon. State v. Benson, 183 N. C. 795, 799, 111 S. E. 869, 871 (1922).
100. The burden is always upon the state to rebut exculpatory evidence contained in
its own case. State v. Copenbarger, 52 Idaho 441, 16 P. (2d) 383 (1932); State v. Greg-
ory, 203 N. C. 528, 166 S. E. 387 (1932).
101. Murphy v. State, 37 Ala. 142, 144 (1861).
11... when the state has proved the commission of a homicide by a defendant, the pre-
sumption is that he is guilty of either murder in the first or second degree, unless the
proof offered by the state itself tends to reduce the offense to manslaughter or show that
the defendant was justifiable or excusable." Miranda v. State, 26 P. (2d) 241, 243 (Ariz.
1933).
102. 5 WiGmoRE, loc. cit. supra, note 94.
103. Mann v. State, 124 Ga. 760, 762, 53 S. E. 324, 325 (1906); State v. Cassim, supra
note 91.
104. We "may take it for a general rule that all homicide is malicious, and of course
amounts to murder, unless where justified, . . . excused . . . or alleviated into man-
slaughter . . . and all these circumstances of justification, excuse or alleviation it is en-
cumbent upon the prisoner to make out to the satisfaction of the court and jury. ....
4 BL. Co . (1897) 201. See also Stepp v. State, 170 Ark. 1061, 1067, 282 S. W. 684,
687 (1926); Wallen v. Commonwealth, 134 Va. 773, 784, 114 S. E. 786, 790 (1922); State
v. Wilson, supra note 92, at 581, 121 S. E. at 729; State v. Cassim, supra note 91. "Proof
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"Implied malice," in addition to being employed where the idea in-
tended could be conveyed to better advantage by (1) "inferred malice"
and (2) "presumed malice," has also a third usage. In this sense it is
used to cover such part of the field of malice aforethought as is not in-
cluded within the term "express malice."' ° And just as "express malice"
may have any one of four meanings, depending upon whether the user
does nut include (within the intent to kill) the intent to inflict great
bodily injury, and whether he does or does not include an intent directed
at some person other than the one killed, so "implied malice," when used
to complement that term, has four corresponding variations.
IV
Intent to Kill or to Inflict Great Bodily Injury
At this juncture, putting carefully to one side "inferred malice" and
"presumed malice," as terms which make important contributions to the
law. the phrases "express malice" and "implied malice" should be elimi-
nated from consideration. This will permit undivided attention to b6
directed to malice aforethought itself. There need be no hesitation in
saying that malice aforethought is present whenever-in the absence of
justification, excuse or some special circumstance of mitigation-ther,
is an intent to kill' 06 or'to inflict great bodily injury,"0 7 regardless of
whether this intent is focused upon the person who is actually killed or
upon some other. 08 One, for example, who maliciously shoots at an
enemy and happens to kill a friend, is guilty of murder. 0 9
Reference to the intent to inflict great bodily injury requires further
attention. The ancient writers seem to have made no distinction based
upon the degree of bodily force intended to be inflicted. Lambard (whose
Eirenarcha appeared shortly after the legislative division of felonious
or admission of an intentional killing with a deadly weapon raises two presumptions against
the killer: First, that the killing was unlawful; and, second, that it was done with malice.
This is murder in the second degree." State v. Bailey, 205 N. C. 255, 171 S. E. 81 (1933).
105. See, e.g., State v. Galvano, 34 Del. 409, 154 Atl. 461 (1930).
106. State v. Pasour, 183 N. C. 793, 111 S. E. 779 (1922).
107. State v. Calabrese, 107 N. J. L. 115, 151 AUt. 781 (1930); Commonwealth v.
Marshall, 287 Pa. 512, 135 At. 301 (1926).
108. State v. Flathers, 57 S. D. 320, 232 N. V. 51 (1930). "This malice is so odious
in law, as though it be intended against one, it shall be extended towards another." 3 Co.
IST. (1797) 51.
109. People v. Weeks, 104 Cal. App. 708, 286 Pac. 514 (1930); Durham v. State, 171
S. E. 265 (Ga. 1933). Under some statutes such a homicide will be a different degree of
murder than if the fatal force had reached its intended victim. See, for example, Honey-
cutt v. State, 42 Tex. Cr. App. 129, 132, 57 S. W. 806, 807 (1900).
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homicide into two grades depending upon the presence or absence of
malice aforethought)' 0 says that if a servant beats a man at the com-
mand of his master, and the man dies of the beating, it is murder by both,
no qualification being mentioned as to the nature or extent of the beating,
either inflicted or commanded."' This, in substance, is repeated by
Coke,1"2 who, moreover, defines express malice aforethought in terms of
an intent "to kill, wound, or beat another.""' 3 Hale is even more specific,
saying: "Malice in fact is a deliberate intention of doing any bodily harm
to another, whereunto by law he is not authorized.""' 4 An important
qualification is suggested by Blackstone, who says that one may be guilty
of murder if he "beats another in a cruel and unusual manner so that
he dies, though he did not intend his death.""" And East speaks of an
intent "to deprive another of life, or do him some great bodily harm."" 6
Perhaps such statements as those of Lambard, Coke, and Hale represent
an inadvertent carry-over from an earlier time, when nearly every homi-
cide was a capital offense, at least in legal theory, and when pardons
were probaby not recommended except for those who were thought to
be entirely free from fault. However this may be, it is well established
at the present time that the degree of bodily violence intended is a vital
matter in this regard. It may be so great as to constitute malice afore-
thought (in the absence of justification, excuse or mitigation), although
the resulting death is not a part of the actual design; 17 or it may be too
slight for this purpose."" "Every assault," the Michigan court has said,
"involves bodily harm, but any doctrine which would hold every assail-
ant as a murderer where death follows his act, would be barbarous and
unreasonable.""" To designate the degree of intended bodily violence,
less than death, which is sufficient to constitute malice aforethought (in
the absence of justification, excuse or mitigation), the courts have made
110. The statutes were enacted in 1496, 1512, 1531, and 1547. See note 60, supra.
Eirenarcha was written in 1581. See note 73, supra.
111. LAixARD, op. cit. supra note 74, at 244.
112. 3 Co. INsT. (1797) 51.
113. Ibid.
114. 1 HALE P. C. (1847) 451 (italics added). In the case of correction of a servant
by his master, Hale distinguishes between moderate correction and immoderate correction.
But this is upon the notion that a moderate correction was authorized by law in such a
case and hence not unlawful at all. Id. at 454.
115. 4 BL. CoMM. (1897) 199.
116. 1 EAsT P. C. (1806) 222.
117. State v. Calabrese; Commonwealth v. Marshall, both supra note 107.
118. McAndrews v. People, supra note 92, at 548, 208 Pac. at 490; People v. Cren-
shaw, 298 Il. 412, 417, 131 N. E. 576, 578 (1921).
119. Wellar v. People, 30 Mich. 16, 20 (1874).
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use of such expressions as "grievous mischief,"'120 "great bodily harm,"12'
or "serious bodily harm."'22
Obviously no mere phrase can serve as a solvent for all cases in which
this problem may be involved, but such characterizations point in the
general direction and the decided cases give additional guidance. If the
purpose is to cause bodily injury by means of a "deadly weapon"' 23 or
a "dangerous instrument,' 1 24 it is an intent to cause great bodily harm
or injury, assuming that the weapon or instrument is used in a dangerous
manner,12 even if there is no actual design to cause death. 2  This is
true, for example, where the defendant shot at the deceased,12 7 or cut
him across the neck with a razor, 128 or hit him over the head with a heavy
iron bar, 29 or threw at him a heavy glass tumbler,' or a rock "the size
of a man's fist,"' 3 ' or choked him violently though without intending to
kill. 2 The old formula of finding an intent to kill because "one is pre-
sumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his act" is
sometimes encountered in such cases, 3 but this should yield to a more
accurate analysis. The intent to inflict great bodily injury is sufficient
without an actual design to cause death. 3 Acts such as indicated in the
illustrations may give rise to an inference of fact that there was an actual
Intent to kill; but this inference may be overcome by evidence. If this
120. Ibid.
121. Commonwealth v. Marshall, supra note 107, at 519, 135 Atl. at 303.
122. Martinez v. State, 30 Tex. App. 129, 137, 16 S. W. 767, 768 (1891).
123. People v. Collins, 166 Mich. 4, 7, 131 N. W. 78, 80 (1911); Commonwealth v.
Robinson, 305 Pa. 302, 310, 157 Atl. 689, 692 (1931); State v. Wilson, supra note 92.
124. McAndrews v. People, supra note 92; State v. Brown, 152 Iowa 427, 437, 132
N. W. 862, 866 (1911).
125. For example, while a sword is a deadly weapon, an intent to slap another across
the back with the flat side of the blade might not involve an intent to inflict great bodily
injury. On the other hand a heavy revolver might be used in a dangerous manner by us-
ing it as a club to strike another over the head, as well as by shooting with it.
126. State v. Calabrese, supra note 107.
127. Ibid.
128. Rhodes v. State, 104 Fla. 520, 140 So. 309 (1932).
129. Grey's Case, Kel. J. 64 (Eng. 1666); Commonwealth v. Dillard, 169 Atl. 138 (Pa.
1933).
130. Mayes v. People, 106 Ill. 306 (1883).
131. Killian v. State, 184 Ark. 239, 42 S. W. (2d) 12 (1931). This was an assault case
in which the court said it would have been murder if the victim had died.
132. Commonwealth v. Marshall, supra note 107.
133. See, for example, McAndrews v. People, supra note 92, at 548, 203 Pac. at 488;
People v. Crenshaw, supra note 118. In these cases it was held that the particular force
used was insufficient to create this "presumption" because death was not the natural and
probable result.
134. State v. Calabrese, supra note 107.
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inference is overcome the accused is still guilty of murder (in the absence
of justification, excuse or mitigation), but under many statutes it may
be a different degree of murder than it would be if the purpose to cause
death had been established. 3 "
On the other side attention must be directed to the difference between
a battery and great bodily injury. The former may be substantially
more than "technical" without meeting the requirements of the latter.
And in pursuing this inquiry no group of cases will be found more useful
than those involving a blow with the fist. Such a blow, particulary if
directed at the head or face, may be expected to cause pain, and even
actual injury-such as a broken nose or jaw. Under ordinary circum-
stances, however, it does not measure up to the degree of violence which
the courts have in mind when phrases such as "grievous bodily harm"
or "great bodily injury" are used in the homicide cases.'36 Where there
is great disparity of strength between the assailant and his victim, by
reason of the latter being very young or very old or enfeebled by disease,
for example, even an attack with the bare hands may be sufficient to
constitute malice aforethought.'3 The same may be true if the beating
is long continued, 3 ' or if there is some dangerous advantage of posi-
tion.139  And while an intent to administer an ordinary kick is not suffi-
cient for malice aforethought, one may be guilty of murder by stamping
upon a prostrate victim until death ensues. 40
V
Wanton and Wilful Disregard of Unreasonable Human Risk
Reference to the intent to kill or to cause great bodily injury must not
divert attention from the possibility of malice aforethought in the absence
135. Commonwealth v. Marshall, supra note 107.
136. McAndrews v. People, supra note 92; Commonwealth v. Fox, 73 Mass. 585, 589
(1856).
"Death or great bodily harm must be the reasonable or probable consequences of the act
to constitute murder. . . . The striking of a blow with the fist on the side of the face or
head is not likely to be attended with dangerous or fatal consequences, and no inference
of an intent to kill is warranted from the circumstances disclosed by the proof in this case.'
Hence the killing was manslaughter rather than murder. People v. Crenshaw, supra note
118, at 416, 417, 131 N. E. at 577.
137. Macklin's Case, 2 Lewin C. C. 225, 226 (Eng. 1838); McAndrews v. People, supra
note 92; Commonwealth v. Fox, supra note 136.
138. Macklin's Case, supra note 137.
139. If the bare hands are used to choke the victim, for example, this may be sufficient
for malice aforethought. Commonwealth v. Marshall, supra note 107.
140. Murphy v. People, 9 Colo. 435, 13 Pac. 528 (1886); Maudling v. Commonwealth,
172 Ky. 370, 189 S. W. 251 (1916).
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of either. The approach to this side of the problem has been well ex-
pressed as follows: "As far as wickedness goes it is difficult to suggest
any distinction worth taking between an infention to inflict bodily injury,
and reckless indifference whether it is inflicted or not."'' One may be
guilty of murder for killing a person as a result of shooting "regardless
of consequences" into a crowd,'4 2 or into a room,'43 or a house 44 where
persons are known to be, or into a train 45 or an automobile' 41 in which
persons are known to be riding. "If he did this," said one court in a
case of this nature, "not with the design of killing any one, but for his
diversion merely, he is guilty of murder."'41  In a well-known case a man
threw a heavy glass tumbler in the direction of his wife. The glass hit
a lamp she was carrying and caused the oil therein to take fire and burn
her, causing her death. This was held to be murder whether he intended
the tumbler to hit his wife, or to hit some other person, or whether,
without any specific intent, he threw the glass with a general malicious
recklessness, disregarding any and all consequences. 4s
Not only may malice aforethought be present when there is no actual
design to kill or injure; it may even co-exist with a definite wish that
such harm may be avoided, if an act is wilfully done with the knowledge
that it may probably cause death or great bodily injury.' 49 This, however,
must not be confused with criminal negligence. One who fails to exer-
cise due care under the circumstances, is negligent. But to convict of
crime on the ground of homicide resulting from negligence "there must
be shown more gross and culpable negligence than is sufficient to render
a defendant liable in a civil suit."' 50 If such criminal negligence is shown
it will support a conviction of manslaughter.' 51  Hence for an uninten-
tional homicide to be murder it must involve a greater degree of culp-
141. 3 S-PHmN, op. cit. supra note 11, at 56.
142. Durham v. State, supra note 109; State v. Saunders, 108 W. Va. 148, 150 S. E.
519 (1929).
143. State v. Capps, 134 N. C. 622, 46 S. E. 730 (1904).
144. People v. Jernatowski, supra note 82.
145. Banks v. State, 85 Tex. Cr. App. 165, 211 S. W. 217 (1919).
146. Davis v. State, 106 Tex. Cr. App. 300, 292 S. W. 220 (1927).
147. Brown v. Commonwealth, 13 Ky. L. Rep. 372, 373, 17 S. W. 220, 221 (1891).
148. Mayes v. People, supra note 130.
149. State v. Capps, supra note 143.
150. State v. Blaine, 104 N. J. L. 325, 328, 137 Atl. 829, 831 (1928). See also Fitz-
gerald v. State, 112 Ala. 34, 20 So. 966 (1895); State v. Davis, 128 S. C. 265, 122 S. E.
770 (1924). Statutory negligent homicide occasionally omits this requirement. People v.
Campbell, 237 Mich. 424, 212 N. W. 97 (1927).
151. Herrington v. State, 31 Ga. App. 167, 120 S. E. 554 (1923); Commonwealth v.
Mayberry, 290 Pa. 195, 138 AtI. 686 (1927).
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ability than is implied in the term "criminal negligence." To express
this notion the courts have resorted to such forms of expression as, "an
act dangerous to others . . . done so recklessly or wantonly as to evince
depravity of mind and a disregard of human life";'- "such cruel acts
and conduct as indicate a reckless disregard of human life"; 1 3' "an
intent to do any unlawful act which may probably result in depriving the
party of life"; " or "an unlawful act, which in its consequences naturally
tends to destroy the life of a human being."'" And one of the leaders of
the law has spoken of an act done with "knowledge of such circumstances
that according to common experience there is a plain and strong likeli-
hood that death will follow the contemplated act."'1
6
So far attention has been directed to the intent to kill, the intent to
inflict great bodily injury, and the wilful doing of an act under such
circumstances that there is obviously a plain and strong likelihood that
death or great bodily injury may result. If this covered the entire field
of our investigation it would be quite proper to speak of malice afore-
thought in terms of a "man-endangering-state-of-mind." A "man-killing-
state-of-mind" would be too narrow and would require fiction to be sub-
stituted for a frank recognition of the necessary psychical fact. A "man-
hurting-state-of-mind" would cover too much in some respects, by in-
cluding the intent to inflict a hurt amounting to less than great bodily
injury, while it would be too narrow in another direction. The expression
"man-endangering-state-of-mind," however, seems to be free from these
objections even if the exact meaning assigned to it is somewhat arbitrary.
But may it properly be applied to homicides committed while perpetrat-
ing or attempting a felony, or while resisting a lawful arrest, or a lawful
attempt to suppress a riot or an affray?
VI
Homicide Resulting from Felony
The first of these has been the subject of much judicial consideration.
The robber who kills the person he is attempting to rob, is guilty of
murder whether he intended any personal harm or not.'57 If he holds up
152. State v. Capps, supra note 143, at 629, 46 S. E. at 732.
153. State v. Collins, 5 Penn. 263, 269-70, 62 Atl. 224, 226 (Del. 1903).
154. Shorter v. State, 147 Tenn. 355, 358, 247 S. W. 985, 986 (1922).
155. Ashford v. State, 144 Ga. 832, 88 S. E. 205 (1916).
156. Per Holmes, C. J., in Commonwealth v. Chance, supra note 98, at 252, 54 N. E.
at 554.
157. McCutcheon v. State, supra note 21, at 257, 155 N. E. at 548; Commonwealth v.
Madeiros, supra note 82; State v. Bell, 205 N. C. 225, 171 S. E. 50 (1933); Common-
wealth v. Epps, 193 Pa. 512, 518, 44 Atl. 570, 571 (1899); Commonwealth v. Dillard, supra
note 129.
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the victim at the point of a gun and the weapon goes off, causing death,
it makes no difference that the discharge was quite accidental" s It is
no element of mitigation that he was "shaking and nervous and pulled
the trigger" unintentionally,a 9 nor that the weapon was unexpectedly
seized and went off by accident during a struggle for its possession.6 0
Train robbers who forced a brakeman to go with them to the express car
were held guilty of his murder, although the death resulted from a shot
fired by a passenger in the defense of the car, since they had feloniously
exposed him to this risk. 6 One who commits arson may be found
guilty of the murder of an inhabitant of the building who lost his life
in the fire even though personal injury was neither intended nor contem-
plated. 62 Even if there was no person in the building when the fire was
feloniously started, the incendiary may be convicted of murder if a fire-
man is killed in the effort to extinguish the blaze. 6 3 A rapist who causes
the death of his victim by this felonious force is guilty of murder. 64
This is true even if the death is quite unintentional, and whether it re-
sulted from violence used by him to perpetrate the act,16 5 or from a
disease communicated by him during the intercourse.' 66 A burglar,
moreover, is guilty of murder if homicide results from the perpetration
of this offense.' 67  In fact it is a common statement that homicide com-
mitted while perpetrating or attempting a felony is murder. 68
A glance at the history of this subject will disclose that here also there
158. Commonwealth v. McManus, supra note 21.
159. McCutcheon v. State, supra note 21.
160. Commonwealth v. Lessner, 274 Pa. 108, 118 Atl. 24 (1922); State v. Best, supra
note 21.
161. Keaton v. State, 41 Tex. Cr. App. 621, 57 S. W. 1125 (1900).
162. Reddick v. Commonwealth, 17 Ky. L. Rep. 1020, 33 S. W. 416 (1895); State v.
Meadows, 330 Mo. 1020, 51 S. W. (2d) 1033 (1932).
163. State v. Glover, supra note 82.
164. Commonwealth v. Hanlon, 8 Phila. 401 (Pa. 1870); State v. Whitfield, 129 Wash
134, 224 Pac. 559 (1924).
165. Buel v. People, 78 N. Y. 492 (1879).
166. Regina v. Greenwood, 7 Cox C. C. 404 (1857). As this was statutory rape the
jury was reluctant to bring in a verdict of guilty of murder, and the court permitted them
to find the defendant guilty of manslaughter. But the instruction authorized the other
verdict.
167. People v. Green, 217 Cal. 176, 17 P. (2d) 730 (1932).
168. Perhaps the most common citation is a dictum in Rex v. Plummer, Kel. 109, 117
(1701): "So if two men have a design to steal a hen, and one shoots at the hen for that
purpose, and a man be killed, it is murder in both, because the design was felonious."
See also Regina v. Horsey, 3 Frost. & F. 287, 288-9 (1862) ; State v. Cross, 72 Conn. 722,
729, 46 Atl. 148, 151 (1900); State v. Leeper, 70 Iowa 748, 30 N. W. 501 (1886) ; Smith v.
State, 33 Me. 48, 55 (1851); State v. Hopkirk, 84 Mo. 278, 287 (1884); State v. Cooper,
13 N. J. L. 361, 370 (1833) ; Dolan v. People, 64 N. Y. 485 (1876).
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has been a decided shift in the legal view during the centuries. "If the
act be unlawful," said Coke, "it is murder.' 169 Hale was unwilling to
repeat such a sweeping assertion. He gives illustrations of unlawful acts
resulting in death which he says are murder,170 and others which he
classifies as manslaughter. 17 ' This limitation is given more definite form
by Foster, who says that an accidental homicide resulting from an un-
lawful act (with the qualification-"if it be malum in se") is murder if
the crime be of the grade of felony, but that otherwise it is man-
slaughter.172 Foster's view was accepted by Blackstone 73 and East, 74
but Judge Stephen was very positive that this was still too broad. "To
take another very old illustration," said he in a famous case,171 "it was
said that if a man shot at a fowl with intent to steal it, and accidentally
killed a man, he was to be accounted guilty of murder, because the act
was done in the commission of a felony. I very much doubt, however,
whether that is really the law, or whether the court for the Consideration
of Crown Cases Reserved would hold it to be so." In fact he seemed
inclined to require for murder, in such a case, the same degree of wanton
and wilful disregard for human life which would constitute malice afore-
thought if no felony were being attempted. 6
The present law of England seems to fall midway between the views
of Foster and Stephen. Not every death resulting from an act done in
the commission of a felony is murder, but such a homicide may constitute
this crime without the same degree of human risk being involved as
would otherwise be requisite. It is not necessary to show the wilful
doing of an act under such circumstances that there is obviously a plain
and strong likelihood that death or great bodily injury may result. On
the other hand the element of human risk cannot be excluded without
at the same time excluding the possibility of murder. "If a man by the
169. 3 Co. INST. (1797) 56.
170. 1 HALE P. C. (1847) 465.
171. Id. at 475.
172. Fosraa C. C. (1791) 258.
173. "And if one intends to do another felony, and undesignedly kills a man, this is also
murder." 4 BL. CoIN. (1897) 200-1.
174. 1 EAST P. C. (1806) 255.
175. Regina v. Sern6, 16 Cox C. C. 311, 312-3 (1887). Holdsworth doubts whether
the rule as stated by Foster would now be followed without some limitation. 8 HOLDS-
worH, op. cit. supra note 26, at 436.
176. "I think that, instead of saying that any act done with intent to commit a felony
and which causes death amounts to murder, it would be reasonable to say that any act
known to be dangerous to life, and likely in itself to cause death done for the purpose of
committing a felony, which caused death, should be murder." Regina v. Serni, supra
note 175, at 313.
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perpetration of a felonious act brings about the death of a fellow creature
he is guilty of murder, unless when he committed the felonious act the
chance of death resulting therefrom was so remote that no reasonable
man would have taken it into his consideration. In that case he is not
guilty of murder, but only of manslaughter."' 7
Such a position has much to commend it. It places upon the man who
is committing or attempting a felony the hazard of guilt of murder if he
creates any substantial human risk which actually results in the loss of
life; and it does this without including within this offense those homicides
which occur so unexpectedly that no reasonable man would have con-
sidered that any risk of this nature was involved. Certain felonies have
so frequently been attended with death or great bodily harm, which was
not intended or contemplated by the particular wrongdoer, that they
must be classified as "dangerous."' 7 8  Common experience points to the
presence of a substantial human risk from the mere perpetration of such
wrongful acts. The typical examples are arson, burglary, rape, and
robbery. The intent to avoid all personal harm, formed in the mind of
the transgressor at the time he embarks upon such felonies, is no reason-
able safeguard that death will not result before he is finished. If we add
to this list the crime of larceny, and those offenses which directly contem-
plate death or great bodily injury, we have completed the list of common-
law felonies. 179 In other words, with the single exception of larceny,
the common-law felonies were either directed toward death or great bodily
injury, or involved a substantial risk of this nature. And while an at-
tempted larceny happens to be the "very old illustration" used by Coke80
(who regarded homicide resulting from any unlawful act as murder)'
177. Regina v. Whitmarsh, 62 just. P. 711 (1898). The quotation is from the syllabus.
To the same general effect see Rex v. Lumley, 22 Cox C. C. 635 (1911).
178. It has not been uncommon to provide, by statute, that murder committed by per-
petrating or attempting such felonies shall be of the first degree. See, for example, Apiz.
CODE (Struckmeyer, 1928) § 4584; CAL. Pzxi. CODE (Deering, 1931) § 189; Com. GEN.
STAT. (1923) § 21-401; FLA. Coarp. LAWS (1927) § 7137; IOWA CODE (1931) § 12911;
Mice. ComrP. LAWS (1929) § 16708; ORE. CODE ANN. (1930) § 14-201. Many considera-
tions may have been involved in such legislative action, but the. peculiar element of hu-
man risk in such offenses was probably not overlooked. This is emphasized by additions
sometimes made to this list, such as mayhem, which is common, or "injury to any person
or property by means of any explosive compound" (Conn.).
179. Pollock and Maitland add false imprisonment. 2 PoLLOCz AND MAIrLAND, op.
cit. supra note 24, at 468, 487. But see 3 BL. CoIart. (1897) 127; 4 id. 218; 1 EAST P. C.
(1806) c. 9.
180. ". . if A, meaning to steale a deere in the park of B, shooteth at the deer, and
by the glance of the arrow killeth a boy that is hidden in a bush: this is murder . . .
although A had no intent to hurt the boy, nor knew not of him." 3 Co. INsT. (1797) 56.
181. See note 169, supra.
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and also the subject of a much cited dictum,18 2 a study of the cases which
repeat the formula that homicide committed while perpetrating or at-
tempting a felony is murder, will disclose that the other felony actually
involved is one which may properly be classified as "dangerous," such
as robbery,183 rape,184 burglary,18 5 arson,'86 malicious burning,8 7 or
criminal abortion. 88
To test whether the statement, in its unlimited form, actually repre-
sents the law of this country, it is necessary to consider felonies of a non-
dangerous nature. Furthermore, an additional caution must be added.
One who is perpetrating a felony which seems not of itself to involve
any element of human risk, may resort to a dangerous method of com-
mitting it, or may make use of dangerous force to deter others from
interfering. If the dangerous force thus used results in death, the crime
is murder just as much as if the danger was inherent in the very nature
of the felony itself. For obvious reasons a felony which does not of itself
involve any substantial element of human risk, and which is not ac-
companied in the particular instance by the use of dangerous force, will
very rarely result in the death of a human being. Because of this very
few cases squarely raise the question. The matter, however, has not
escaped attention in this country. The Kentucky court has given a
striking illustration in a very famous case.8 9 "Under our statute," said
the court, "the removal of a cornerstone is punishable by a short term
in the penitentiary, and is therefore a felony. If, in attempting this
offense, death were to result to one conspirator by his fellow accidentally
dropping the stone upon him, no Christian court would hesitate to apply
this limitation." The "limitation" mentioned is that the homicide would
be manslaughter rather than murder notwithstanding it resulted from
the commission of a felony. An intimation to this effect, though not so
directly stated, was mentioned by the New Jersey court a hundred years
ago. 0o
182. Rex v. Plummer, supra note 168. The actual case involved armed resistance to arrest
and the special verdict indicated that the discharge of the weapon was not by accident.
183. Commonwealth v. Madeiros, supra note 82; State v. Hopkirk, supra note 168;
People v. Koerber, 244 N. Y. 147, 152, 155 N. E. 79, 82 (1926); McDonald v. State, 15 P.
(2d) 1094 (Okla. 1932).
184. State v. Cross, supra note 168.
185. Dolan v. People, supra note 168; People v. Greenwall, 115 N. Y. 520, 522-3, 22
N. E. 180 (1889).
186. State v. Glover, supra note 82; State v. Cooper, supra note 168.
187. Regina v. Horsey, supra note 168.
188. State v. Leeper; Smith v. State, both supra note 168.
189. Powers v. Commonwealth, 110 Ky. 386, 416, 61 S. W. 935, 63 S. W. 776 (1901).
190. In stating the rule that death resulting from a felony is murder, the court added
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The leading American decision on this point is one handed down in
Michigan a few years ago. 9' The defendant sold liquor, under circum-
stances amounting to a felony, to a purchaser who became drunk and died
from exposure. The court refused to hold that the mere fact of this
accidental death resulting from this felony was sufficient to constitute
the offense of murder. "Notwithstanding the fact that the statute has
declared it to be a felony," reads the opinion, "it is an act not in itself
directly and naturally dangerous to life."
The formula that homicide committed while perpetrating or attempting
a felony is murder must also be challenged because it speaks in terms
of coincidence, whereas the requirement is causation. 92 The word
"while" is inaccurate and misleading in this connection. Of less impor-
tance, though not to be entirely overlooked, is a purely technical point.
It would be futile to recognize the sudden heat of passion, engendered
by great provocation, as sufficiently mitigating to reduce a voluntary
homicide to manslaughter, if in the next breath it was added that man-
slaughter is a dangerous felony and hence any homicide resulting there-
from must be murder. It is not necessary to mention other types of this
offense. The distinction between murder and manslaughter, felonies
both, makes it necessary to qualify any rule as to the nature of homicide
resulting from felonies by limiting it to felonies other than felonious homi-
cide itself. This has usually been taken for granted, but sometimes it has
been forced upon the attention of the courts in the interpretation of
statutes. In such cases the courts have held it to be essential in order
this significant qualification,--"especially if death were a probable consequence of the act."
State v. Cooper, supra note 168. This qualification probably requires a greater degree of
human risk than would be insisted upon for malice aforethought in a felony case, but it
indicates that the court, even at that time, was not entirely satisfied with the statement
in unlimited form.
191. People v. Pavlic, 227 Mich. 562, 119 N. W. 373 (1924).
192. For example, a Texas statute declares driving while intoxicated to be a felony.
And this would seem to be clearly a dangerous felony. But it was held that if one, driv-
ing while intoxicated, suddenly has a flat tire which swerves the car into a ditch where
another is hit and killed, he is not by reason of this fact alone guilty of murder. Burton v.
State, 55 S. W. (2d) 813 (Tex. Cr. App. 1932). As it is sometimes said, it is necessary to
show that "death ensued in consequence of the felony," Buel v. People, 78 N. Y. 492, 497
(1879); or that it was "consequent to the felony." Pliemling v. State, 46 Wis. 516, 521,
1 N. W. 278, 281 (1879). See also a manslaughter case in which it was held necessary to
establish a causal connection between the unlawful act and the death. Jackson v. State,
101 Ohio St. 152, 127 N. E. 870 (1920). It was said in another manslaughter case: "And
where an allegation that the defendant did an unlawful act is relied on, as in the first
count, the mere averment that 'while' this unlawful act was being done, the defendant
killed another by accident or mischance does not supply the place of averments of facts
showing that the alleged unlawful act was a proximate cause of the homicide." Kimmel v.
State, 198 Ind. 444, 455, 154 N. E. 16, 20 (1926).
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to bring the case within this rule, that the slayer was engaged in some
other felony, so distinct "as not to be an ingredient of the homicide"
itself.0 3
To stress these qualifications it should be stated that homicide is
murder (if no statute in the particular jurisdiction requires a different
answer)" 4 provided the death ensues in consequence of some other
felony which involves a substantial element of human risk, or is caused
by a dangerous act committed in furtherance of such felonious design.
To this may be added the explanation, previously suggested, that the
danger here referred to may fall considerably short of a plain and strong
likelihood that death or great bodily injury will result, but must not be
so remote that no reasonable man would have taken it into consideration.
VII
Resistance to Lawful Arrest, and to a Lawful Attempt to Suppress a Riot
Homicide resulting from resistance to a lawful arrest seems to require
a similar explanation. At a time when malice aforethought was under-
stood to include a substantial element of time, an intentional killing by
one who was resisting a lawful arrest, with full knowledge of the circum-
stances, was held to satisfy this requirement: "the law will adjudge it
to be murder, and that the murderer had malice prepense, because he set
himself against the justice of the realm."'1 The apparent rationalization,
that such a one had thought the matter over in advance and determined
rather to kill than to be taken into custody, 96 may be fictitious rather
193. State v. Fisher, 120 Kan. 226, 230, 243 Pac. 291, 293 (1926) ; People v. Hilter, 184
N. Y. 237, 244, 77 N. E. 6, 8 (1906).
194. If the statute changes the rule of the common law by adding the word "purposely"
in the section dealing with murder, an unintentional killing will not qualify even if it re-
sults from a dangerous felony. See O~ro CODE (1930) § 12403; Robbins v. State, 8
Ohio St. 131 (1857). Compare § 12401 in which the word "purposely" does not appear.
On the other hand, a statute providing that "homicide is murder . . .when perpetrated
without any design to effect death by a person engaged in the commission of any felony"
seems to cover every case in which there was a legally recognizable causal connection be-
tween the felonious act and the death, however remote the element of human risk may
seem to have been. See OnI.A. STAT. (1931) § 2216. See also Wis. STAT. (1931) § 340.09;
N. Y. PENi. LAW (1929) § 1044. And see State v. Welch, 25 P. (2d) 211 (N. M. 1933).
195. Yong's Case, 4 Co. Rep. 40a (1587) (italics added).
196. The old books do not spell this out for us in detail, but Lambard leaves no doubt
that he was thinking along this general line. This is one of the instances in which he says
the law judges a killing "to have proceeded of former malice, meditated within his owne
mind, howsoever it be kept secret from the sight of other men." LAAm, op. cit. supra
note 74, at 242. And in another instance, that of the thief who killed another whom he
intended to rob, he amplifies by saying that the law "implyeth a former malicious disposi-
tion in him rather to kill the man than not to have his money from him." Id. at 244.
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than a reasonable inference of fact. But the starting point is a pronounce-
ment on the subject which was not dealing with accidental and unex-
pected homicides. 97 Lambard limits his statement to that of a man
who "hath drawne his weapon, and killed."' 198 Coke, who regarded homi-
cide resulting from any unlawful act as murder, 9 quite logically placed
in the same category the killing of one who was making a lawful arrest.20
And his generalization has been frequently repeated.2 ' However, a
study of the cases in which this statement appears will ordinarily dis-
close that the killing resulted from shooting 2 2 or from the use of some
other dangerous force, such as stabbing with a knife0 3 or striking with a
heavy club.2°0 It is sometimes said that no particular malice is required
to establish murder in such a case; 20 5 but it would be more accurate to
Yong's Case, supra note 195, is also interesting in this respect. This case held that one
who killed to avoid arrest was guilty of murder although he "knew not the party that was
killed." This statement seems meaningless in a murder case until we recall the normal re-
quirement of the time, that the malicious scheme must have been thought of well in ad-
vance of the fatal act. The explanation seems to be that although he had not designed
harm against this very person, he had malice prepense because he had determined to use
fatal force if necessary to avoid arrest. In another case, inwhich no resistance to arrest
was involved, the jury was instructed as follows: "Now it bath not been made [to] ap-
pear by any of the evidence that you have heard, that there was any premeditated malice
between them, for they were never in company before, and knew not each other; so that
there could be no manner of malice from him in particular. The next step, Gentlemen, is,
here is nothing that can impute a general malice upon Mr. Walters." Walter's Case, 12 St.
Tr. 113, 121-2 (Eng. 1688).
197. The statutes which resulted in the division of felonious homicide into murder and
manslaughter were enacted in 1496, 1512, 1531 and 1547. See note 60, supra. Writers
before this period would not be concerned with this distinction, and Lambard seems to
have made the first pronouncement on the subject of homicide resulting from resisting a
lawful arrest, insofar as its bearing upon malice aforethought is concerned.
198. LA.BARD, op. cit. supra note 74, at 243.
199. 3 Co. INsT. (1797) 56.
200. Id. at 52.
201. See, e.g., 1 HALE P. C. (1847) 457; EosTER C. C. (1791) 270; 1 EAST P. C. (1806)
302. See also the cases in notes 202-204.
202. See, for example, Brooks v. State, 114 Ga. 6, 39 S. E. 877 (1901); Williford v.
State, 121 Ga. 173, 48 S. E. 962 (1904); Kennedy v. State, 107 -Ind. 144, 6 N. E. 305
(1886); State v. Mowry, 37 Kan. 369, 15 Pac. 282 (1887); Cornett v. Commonwealth, 198
Ky. 236, 248 S. W. 540 (1923); Sexson v. Commonwealth, 239 Ky. 177, 179, 39 S. W. (2d)
229, 230 (1931); State v. Green, 66 Mo. 631, 646 (1877); State v. Albright, 144 Mo. 638,
46 S. W. 620 (1898) ; Bullock v. State, 65 N. J. L. 557, 47 Atl. 62 (1900) ; State v. Genese,
102 N. J. L. 134, 130 Atl. 642 (1925); Love v. State, 15 Okla. Cr. App. 429, 177 Pac. 387
(1919); Wilson v. State, 79 Tenn. 310 (1883); State v. Morgan, 22 Utah 162, 61 Pac. 527
(1900).
203. State v. Zeibart, 40 Iowa 169 (1874).
204. Glaze v. State, 156 Ga. 807, 120 S. E. 530 (1923).
205. Donehy & Prather v. Commonwealth, 170 Ky. 474, 186 S. W. 161 (1916). The
killing was by shooting.
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say that one who is resisting a lawful arrest (that is, an arrest which is
authorized by law and is being made in a proper manner) is acting with-
out justification, excuse 06 or provocation,1 7 and hence that his intent
to make use of deadly force is malice aforethought.
The act of resisting arrest is seldom made under circumstances which
seem to involve no element of human risk; and in the few instances in
which this does happen, fatal consequences are quite improbable. There-
fore it would not be surprising if this were a matter which had not been
forced upon the attention of the courts. In truth, however, it has received
judicial attention both in England and in this country. In Regina v.
Porter,"' the defendant refused to enter the vehicle which was to take
him to jail. The officer making the arrest called assistance for the pur-
pose of forcing the defendant to enter, and one of the persons aiding the
officer was killed by a kick from the defendant. The court instructed
the jury that if the defendant intentionally kicked the deceased in resist-
ing a lawful attempt to take the defendant to jail, the homicide was
murder; but that if his foot happened by accident to strike the other
while the defendant was struggling to avoid being put into the carriage,
the crime was manslaughter only. And the jury found him guilty of
the lesser crime. The same problem was presented in different form in
State v. Weisengoff.200 An officer stepped upon the running board of
defendant's car for the purpose of making an arrest which was entirely
lawful under the circumstances. The defendant was very near the state
line and attempted to drive across a bridge into the neighboring juris-
diction. In this attempt the car struck the bridge and the officer was
killed. It is quite possible the act may have been sufficiently dangerous
to support a conviction of murder; but the jury was not permitted to
inquire into this aspect of the matter. One who caused death by know-
ingly resisting a lawful arrest, according to the instruction to the jury,
was guilty of murder without reference to malice. This was held to be
such prejudicial error as to call for a new trial.
The very nature of a riot or an affray is such as to make it highly
206. If there is legal authorization for the arrest and it is being made in a proper man-
ner the person to be arrested has no right to resist. Floyd v. State, 82 Ala. 16, 2 So. 683
(1886). This is true even if he is innocent of the charge for which he is to be arrested.
Ibid. As the one being arrested is entirely in the wrong if he resists, he cannot invoke the
principle of self-defense. White v. State, 70 Miss. 253, 11 So. 632 (1892).
207. A lawful arrest "can, of itself, be no provocation in law, since every person is
bound to submit to the regular course of justice." State v. Spaulding, 34 Minn. 361, 363,
25 N. W. 793 (1885).
208. 12 Cox C. C. 444 (1873).
209. 85 W. Va. 271, 101 S. E. 450 (1919).
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unlikely that an attempt to suppress either will be resisted in a manner
which involves no substantial element of human risk. If this should
happen, however, and death should unexpectedly result from an act which
seemed so harmless that no reasonable man would have taken into con-
sideration the possibility of fatal consequences, the courts will no doubt
deal with it as in similar situations in the arrest cases, and hold it man-
slaughter rather than murder. Hence it seems proper to say of homicides
resulting from resistance to a lawful arrest or from resistance to a lawful
attempt to suppress a riot or an affray-as was said of homicides result-
ing from felony-that malice aforethought may be found without the
same degree of human risk having been involved as would otherwise be
needed,21° but that the element of human risk cannot be excluded entirely
without excluding murder. It would therefore seem not improper to
speak of malice aforethought, in all cases, in terms of a "man-endanger-
ing-state-of-mind," with the explanation that this means an intent to kill,
or an intent to inflict great bodily injury, or an intent to do an act under
such circumstances that there is obviously a plain and strong likelihood
that death or great bodily harm may result, or-in the case of one who
is committing or attempting a felony, or resisting a lawful attempt to
make an arrest or to suppress a riot or an affray-an intent to do any
act involving a substantial element of human risk.
VIII
Conclusion
The phrase "man-endangering-state-of-mind," if accepted for this pur-
pose and with this explanation, tells only part of the story, for such a
state of mind will not constitute malice aforethought if there are circum-
stances of justification, excuse or mitigation.21' The classic statement in
210. For example, although an ordinary kick does not threaten such great bodily injury
as to amount to malice aforethought, the court, in Regina v. Porter, supra note 20S, in-
structed the jury that if defendant intentionally kicked the deceased in his effort to resist
being taken to jail, he was guilty of murder.
211. It is more common to use the words "justification, excuse or provocation" in this
connection; but if a third word is needed "provocation" is inadequate because there may
be circumstances sufficiently mitigating to reduce a voluntary homicide to manslaughter,
although no provocation is involved. For example, suppose the defendant thought he was
in imminent danger of death and that be must kill to save his life, and he did kill for this
reason. Suppose, also, there was no actual danger to him at the moment, and the facts
fall a little short of reasonable ground for a belief in such danger. In such a case the
homicide is not entirely excused, but the guilt is manslaughter rather than murder al-
though there was no act of provocation. Bliss v. State, 117 Wis. 596, 94 N. W. 325
(1903). Also, a killing to prevent crime may fall short of justification or excuse and still
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this regard is that "we may take it for a general rule that all homicide is
malicious, and of course amounts to murder, unless where justified by
the command or permission of the law, excused on account of accident
or self-preservation, or alleviated into manslaughter by being either the
involuntary consequence of some act not strictly lawful, or (if voluntary)
occasioned by some sudden and sufficiently violent provocation." '212 The
development of the law since Blackstone's time leaves his amplifications
somewhat inadequate, 13 but the basic outline has been firmly estab-
lished,214 and represents the legal view in our day 15 as truly as it did
in his. "Malice, as an ingredient of murder," it is sometimes said, "may
be defined, in legal phrase, as the killing of a human being, without legal
justification, excuse or extenuation." 216
It is the course of caution to call attention to the fact that malice
aforethought is a matter of mind, however convenient it may be to speak
in terms of the absence of circumstances of justification, excuse or miti-
gation. It is a psychical fact just as homicide is a physical fact. It is
the particular kind of mens rea or mind at fault which is required for
the more serious of the two types of felonious homicide. Perhaps it would
be manslaughter rather than murder. Williams v. State, 127 Miss. 851, 90 So. 705 (1922).
Hence it is better to speak in terms of mitigation, even if the mitigating factor will usually
be the sudden heat of passion engendered by great provocation. The question may arise as
to whether the words "justification or excuse" will not cover the entire situation. A killing
in a sudden transport of passion engendered by adequate provocation is really a partial
excuse for the act. Regina v. Chapman, 12 Cox C. C. 4 (1871). In such a case "the law
does not wholly excuse the offense; but the law, in its charity for the imperfections and
weakness of human nature, reduces it from murder to manslaughter." Addington v. United
States, 165 U. S. 184, 186 (1897). See also another case in which malice was spoken of as
an intent to kill "where the law would neither justify nor in any degree excuse the inten-
tion." Jones v. State, 29 Ga. 594, 607 (1860). Another court has said: "Anger, a short
madness, when provoked by a reasonable cause, excuses from the punishment of murder"
but not of manslaughter. Commonwealth v. Bell, Addison 156, 160 (Pa. 1793). The con-
venience, however, of reserving the word "excuse" for cases in which the defendant is en-
titled, to an acquittal, justifies the addition of the word "mitigation" for those circum-
stances which do not establish innocence in, but are sufficient to diminish to manslaughter, a
homicide that would otherwise be murder.
212. 4 BL. CoTTA. (1897) 201.
213. See, for example, note 211, supra.
214. United States v. Bevans, Fed. Cas. No. 14,589 (1816); Hadley v. State, 55 Ala. 31,
38 (1876); Commonwealth v. Drum, 58 Pa. 9, 18 (1868); Jordan v. State, 10 Tex. 479,
493 (1853); McCoy v. State, 25 Tex. 33, 39 (1860); Stevens v. State, 42 Tex. Cr. App.
154, 173, 59 S. W. 545 (1900).
215. Stepp v. State, 170 Ark. 1061, 1067, 282 S. W. 684, 686 (1926); Commonwealth v.
Bedrosian, 247 Mass. 573, 576, 142 N. E. 778, 779 (1924); State v. Williams, 185 N. C.
643, 666, 116 S. E. 570 (1923); State v. Galvano, supra note 105. State v. Cassim, supra
note 91.
216. Cribbs v. State, 86 Ala. 613, 616, 6 So. 109, 110 (1888).
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be more accurate to speak of it as a label which is placed upon a group
of states of mind, any one of which is sufficient for murder. A man-
endangering-state-of-mind is not malice aforethought if there are circum-
stances of justification, excuse or mitigation; but such a state of mind
in the presence of these circumstances is a different psychical fact than
it would be if they were wanting. An intent to kill, to give a very limited
illustration, may be the same intent, in a certain sense, whether it is for
self-preservation, or is formed in a sudden rage engendered by great
provocation, or is part of a well-laid plan for financial gain; but the
psychical fact in its totality is not the same in any two of these. Further-
more, the appraisal or evaluation of appearances is also a psychical fact.
Hence an intent to kill for the purpose of self-defense under circum-
stances in which there is reasonable ground for believing this drastic
step to be necessary, is psychically different from an intent to kill in
self-defense when there is nothing to warrant such a belief. In fact no
inquiry into justification, excuse or mitigation in a homicide case can
be dissociated from the mental element involved in criminal guilt. Per-
haps the most extreme test of this point will be found in the act of
carrying out a lawful sentence of death. If a sheriff is carrying out
such a sentence what difference does it make what his state of mind may
be? The fallacy involved in this question lies in the fact that- the mental
element-the mind without fault-has been satisfied by the assumption
that he is "carrying out" a lawful sentence of death. If a sheriff who
had no knowledge of any sentence of death having been pronounced,
should take the life of his prisoner for some unlawful purpose of his own,
it would be no answer to a murder charge that there existed, unknown to
him, a mandate for him to execute that man on that very day. -2 17 The
extreme unlikelihood of the officer's being unaware of the existence of the
sentence does not affect the legal view of such a situation. The knowl-
edge that he is carrying out the sentence of the court makes this alto-
gether different as a psychical fact than if he acted in ignorance of this
matter.
What has been said suggests the following definition: Malice afore-
thought is an unjustifiable, inexcusable and unmitigated man-endangering-
217. Compare People v. Burt, 51 Mich. 199, 16 N. W. 378 (1883), in which the killing
of an actual felon under circumstances which would have justified the homicide had the
facts been known, was held not to constitute a justification in favor of one who did not
know or have any reason to believe that the person was a felon. Cf. also: "If he vary
from the judgment, as where the judgment is to be hanged, if he behead the party it is
held murder. It must be done by the proper officer, viz. the sheriff or his substitute, if an-
other doth it of his own head, it is held murder." 1 HA. P. C. (1847) 501. See also 3
Co. INsT. (1797) 52; 4 BL. CoMM-x. (1897) 179.
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state-of-mind. Such a statement will not in any way simplify the law
of homicide, because the final phrase must have assigned to it a mean-
ing which will need to be explained in as much detail as would be required
if it were omitted. It has, however, the virtue of placing the emphasis
where it belongs. It speaks of malice aforethought in terms of the state
of mind of the slayer, and it does so frankly without the resort to fiction.
It postulates the absence of justification, excuse and sufficient mitigation
to diminish to manslaughter what would otherwise be murder, and re-
quires either (1) an intent to kill, or (2) an intent to inflict great bodily
injury, or (3) the wanton and wilful disregard of an unreasonable human
risk-the wilful doing of an act under such circumstances that there is
obviously a plain and strong likelihood that death or great bodily injury
may result, or (4) if the person is engaged at the time in perpetrating
or attempting a felony, or in resisting a lawful attempt to make an arrest
or to suppress a riot or an affray, it includes the wilful doing of any act
which involves a substantial element of human riskl 1 ---with the addi-
tional explanation that the common experience of men shows such a
risk to be inherent in certain felonies such as arson, burglary, rape and
robbery.2 10
218. The cases of criminal abortion are illuminating. At a time when surgery was in a
crude stage of its development and when the character and properties of powerful drugs
were little understood, the attempt to produce a miscarriage was an act which was very
dangerous to human life. During that period of history an unlawful attempt to produce a
miscarriage which resulted in the death of the woman was sufficient for murder because of
the plain and strong likelihood that death or great bodily injury might result. 1 HALE
P. C. (1847) 429-30; 4 BL. Co MA. (1897) 201; State v. Moore, 25 Iowa 128, 136-7
(1868). The danger from such an operation has now been minimized to such an extent by
the advancement of medical science that the law, at the present time, if not affected by
statute, is that homicide resulting from an unlawful operation of this nature is either mur-
der or manslaughter-murder if the act was performed in such a manner as likely to result
in death or great bodily injury, and manslaughter if death happened to result by accident
from means which did not render death or great bodily injury probable. Worthington v.
State, 92 Md. 222, 237-8, 48 Atl. 355, 356-7 (1901); Peoples v. Commonwealth, 87 Ky. 487,
9 S. W. 509 (1888). There is still a substantial element of human risk, however, and if the
criminal abortion has itself been made a felony by statute, the resulting death of the woman
is murder no matter what care was used. State v. Fleetwood, 6 Penn. 153, 63 Atl. 772
(Del. 1906); State v. Alcorn, 7 Idaho 599, 64 Pac. 1014 (1901); State v. Smith, 32 Me. 369
(1851); State v. Belyea, 9 N. D. 353, 83 N. W. 1 (1900). If the illegal operation is only
a misdemeanor, the homicide is manslaughter if the act was not performed in a dangerous
manner. State v. McNab, 20 N. H. 160 (1849). By legislative enactment such homicide is
sometimes declared to be murder. Johnson v. People, 33 Colo. 224, 80 Pac. 133 (1905).
Some statutes make it manslaughter. State v. Dagartz, 244 Mo. 218, 148 S. W. 889
(1912). By some it is made a distinct felony. Montgomery v. State, 80 Ind. 338 (1881).
219. It will also avoid the need of speaking in terms of mitigation in certain man-
slaughter cases in which no such element is present. If there was an unlawful intent to
kill, it is necessary to find some element of mitigation to prevent the crime from being
1934]
YALE LAW JOURNAL
The phrase "malice aforethought," although it has been reasonably
stable from day to day, has shifted its moorings appreciably during the
centuries, and gives today no assurance that the period of change has
passed. With its present import, it.is rather a bit of juridical shorthand
than an explanatory expression. It is not a key which unlocks mysteries,
but a label to be attached after the secret is solved. It has no magical
powers. It is not a rule of thumb which can dispense with a rigid scrutiny
of the facts of each particular case. It is, however, a convenient symbol.
The psychical element of the crime of murder is so complex and com-
plicated that legal discussions would be greatly handicapped if there were
no term to express it. Had none been handed down by the ancients,
it is quite probable that one would be created even if it were in the form
familiar to science, such, perhaps, as "state of mind A." If no more
than this is demanded of the phrase "malice aforethought," it has a very
important function to perform.
murder. Hence it is very proper to speak in terms of mitigation if the killing was in the
sudden heat of passion engendered by great provocation. But if the homicide is man-
slaughter because it resulted from culpable negligence it is quite unsound to speak of such
negligence as an element of mitigation. Culpable negligence is an aggravating factor rather
than a mitigating one, but the homicide is not murder because there was no man-endanger-
ing-state-of-mind. There was a man-endangering act but only a criminally negligent state
of mind.
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